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ABSTRACT
Based on the argument that the benefits conferred through the provision of non audit services by 
audit firms outweigh the attributed costs of safeguarding the auditor's independence, this paper 
will not only seek to justify this argument, advance proposals which do not favour an outright 
prohibition of the provision of non audit services, but also consider means through which non 
audit services could be regulated in order to facilitate competition in the audit market. At the 
same time it will consider various legislation which have been introduced in recent years and 
which are aimed at facilitating greater disclosure of information – hence improving transparency 
within the audit and financial markets. “Specific measures,” it is contended, “would involve not 
only the introduction of new standards (for example – the disclosure of client concentration) but 
also the elimination of current restrictions“. Different types of safeguards which exist in order 
“to mitigate or eliminate threats” to the auditor’s independence, as a result of the provision of 
non audit services, will be considered against the regulator’s aim to facilitate competition, 
enhance disclosure and promote other practices which would advance the regulator’s endeavour 
to be more “market friendly”.
The consultation on control structures in audit firms and their consequences on the audit market, 
a consultation which was launched by the European Commission as part of its efforts to create 
more market players, could be regarded as a response to such proposals to facilitate a more 
“market friendly” environment and also to concerns that the financial market is already over 
regulated. Some of the possible ways advanced by the Commission as channels for facilitating 
greater entry into the international market include the deregulation of the capitalisation of audit 
firms as a catalyst for facilitating greater entry into the audit market. Deregulation of the capital 
structure in this sense is considered to be a “modification of Article 3 (4) of the 2006 Directive 
on Statutory Audit which should however not be to the detriment of robust independence rules.”1
Key Words: Principles based regulation; audit; directives; regulation; market; NAS (non 
audit services)
                                                
1
See IP/08/1727 “. Audit firms: Commission Consults on Ways to Help Create More Market Players” <
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/market/index_en.htm> 
REGULATING NON AUDIT SERVICES: Towards a Principles Based 
Approach to Regulation.
Marianne Ojo2
Introduction
In arriving at a decision to how non audit services could be best regulated, this paper will take 
into account the benefits attributed to non audit services and the need to foster greater level of 
competition in the audit market. It will therefore commence with a section which addresses the 
influence of the provision of non audit services, by audit firms, on perceptions of auditor 
confidence. It will then elaborate on this topic by considering the benefits attributed to the 
provision of non audit services. Within this context, the benefits generated (by providing non 
audit services)  and contributed to high quality audits, the impact of the level of non audit fees on 
audit independence and the significance of ensuring that adequate safeguards operate to protect 
the auditor’s independence, will be introduced.
The level of audit and non audit fees will also be considered against the background of standards 
and legislation such as the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants3 , and chapter 8 of the 
2002 Commission Recommendation.4 The second section will then consider arguments in favour 
of market based regulation. It will also elaborate on why other regulatory strategies such as meta 
regulation and principles based regulation (and particularly meta regulation), are preferred to a 
purely oriented market based system of regulation. The third section will then expand on the 
principles based approach to regulation through a consideration of factors and developments 
which have contributed to a need for a principles based approach to regulation. In advancing 
proposals for a change in the existing regulatory arrangements, the fourth section will not only 
take into account the safeguards which currently exist to ensure that the auditor’s independence is 
not compromised, but also emphasize the need for greater disclosure requirements at EU level. It 
will make reference to efforts undertaken by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a 
means of facilitating enhanced disclosure requirements.
The concluding section encapsulates an evaluation of efforts which have been undertaken in 
response to the evolving financial markets, the level of success attained by recently introduced 
directives and legislation which are aimed towards promoting more friendly market measures. It 
also considers how greater informational disclosure requirements have been facilitated within the 
                                                
2 Research Fellow, Center For European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen, Graduate Teaching 
Associate, School of Social Sciences and Law Oxford Brookes University.
3 Revised July 2009
4 2002/590/EC – Statutory Auditor’s Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles
markets and what role regulation has assumed – particularly with regards to the monitoring and 
enforcement of rules and also the form of regulation which would best address an evolving global 
market.
According to Arrunada5, regulators should not only focus on policies which would improve 
transparency of information – hence enhancing market incentives, but should strive towards 
fostering a greater level of competition. Markets, in his opinion, should be the “driving force 
behind the evolution of the industry” – since regulators are not well equipped with the necessary 
knowledge and proper incentives which are required for defining an efficient market framework.6
The consultation7 on control structures in audit firms and their consequences on the audit market, 
a consultation which was launched by the European Commission as part of its efforts to create 
more market players, could be regarded as a response to such proposals to facilitate a more 
“market friendly” environment and also to Arrunada’s concerns that the financial market is 
already over regulated.8 Some of the possible ways advanced by the Commission as channels for 
facilitating greater entry into the international market include: 9
- The deregulation of the capitalisation of audit firms as a catalyst for facilitating greater 
entry into the audit market. Deregulation of the capital structure in this sense is 
considered to be a “modification of Article 3 (4) of the 2006 Directive on Statutory 
Audit, which requires that auditors hold a majority of the voting rights in an audit firm 
and that a majority of auditors control the management board. This should however 
not be to the detriment of robust independence rules.”
- A broader focus on a spectrum of catalysts which could be utilised in facilitating 
greater access into the audit market.
What influence (if any) does the provision of non audit services, by audit firms, have on 
perceptions of auditor independence?
Based on academic literature and empirical evidence10, the impact of the provision of non audit 
services (by accounting firms to their audit clients) on the confidence in the independence of 
                                                
5 See B Arrunada, “The Provision of Non Audit Services by Auditors: Let the Market Evolve and Decide” 
1999 International Review of Law and Economics at page 13. Also refer to abstract where he states that “specific 
measures would involve both introducing new standards and eliminating some current restrictions.”
6 ibid
7 A consultation which was launched in November 2008, and whose deadline was scheduled for the end of 
February 2009
8 See B Arrunada, “ Audit Failure and the Crisis of Auditing” (2004) European Business Organization Law 
Review, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 635-43
9
See IP/08/1727 “. Audit firms: Commission Consults on Ways to Help Create More Market Players” <
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/market/index_en.htm> 
10 According to an analysis (by Quick and Warming Rasmussen) of the effects of 19 different non audit 
services, „a negative effect“ was discovered in relation to these. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that “the type of 
NAS not only influences the degree to which auditor independence is perceived to be impaired,” but “that perceived 
auditor independence does increase if NAS are provided by a separate department of the audit firm.” See R Quick 
auditors has been demonstrated. In my opinion, it is important to distinguish between the effects 
attributed to the volume of non audit services being provided by such accounting firms and the 
type of non audit service11. The provision of non audit services by such firms does not necessarily 
influence the independence of auditors. However where the fees generated from such non audit 
services are considerably high (in proportion to the audit fees earned by such accounting firms) 
and insufficient safeguards operate to protect the auditor’s independence, this creates a situation 
whereby the auditor’s independence is likely to be compromised – since the auditor may be 
denied lucrative contracts (in the form of fees generated from NAS) where he decides to give a 
qualified opinion on the financial statements being audited.
Benefits attributed to the provision of non audit services
Although the level of non audit fees generated from non audit services and provided by an audit 
firm to its client could determine whether or not an auditor’s independence is compromised, the 
level of competence demanded from auditors in providing high quality audits, could in several 
respects, only be derived through the provision of non audit services. Furthermore, the principle 
of professional competence and due care imposes an obligation on all professional auditors to 
“maintain professional knowledge and skill at the level required to ensure that clients or 
employers receive competent professional service.”12
In some cases, the provision of non audit services by accounting firms to their clients is 
considered to be beneficial – particularly where adequate safeguards operate to ensure that the 
auditor’s independence is not compromised.13 Where the level of fees (non audit fees) generated 
by the provision of non audit services by such accounting firm influences the firm’s ability to 
make objective decisions and results in a situation where the firm’s independence is impaired, 
then this would be detrimental to the quality and credibility of the financial statements being 
audited. 
The provision of non audit services in itself does not result in lower quality audits where 
necessary safeguards operate. The existence of necessary safeguards would not only ensure that 
the auditor’s independence is not compromised, it would also facilitate a process whereby costs 
                                                                                                                                                             
and B Warming Rasmussen, ‘ Auditor Independence and the Provision of Non Audit Services: Perceptions by 
German Investors (2009) International Journal of Auditing (13) 141-162 Blackwell Publishing Limited .
11 According to results obtained by Ezzamel et al, the relationship between levels of audit fees and non audit 
services is considered to be dependent on the category of non audit services. See M Ezzamel, DR Gwilliam and KM 
Holland, “ The Relationship between Categories of Non Audit Services and Audit Fees: Evidence from UK 
Companies (2002) International Journal of Auditing (6) 13-35. They also argue that “even though the theoretical 
literature points to important potential links between audit and non audit fees operating through either “knowledge 
spill overs” or differential benefits from “recurring” non audit services, there is no reason to assume that different 
categories of NAS will have the same effect on audit fees.”
12 See Section 130 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (Revised July 2009) at page 13 
http://www.ifac.org/Store/Details.tmpl?SID=1247239521617174&Cart=1247239712617245
13 See M Ezzamel, DR Gwilliam and KM Holland, “ The Relationship between Categories of Non Audit 
Services and Audit Fees: Evidence from UK Companies (2002) International Journal of Auditing (6) 13-35 – for 
instance where this enables the accounting firm to acquire greater knowledge and understanding of the client being 
audited. 
savings (through “knowledge spill overs”, differential benefits from “recurring” non audit 
services and economies of scale) are maximised. Where such safeguards do not operate then the 
provision of non audit services to clients would definitely have an adverse effect on audit quality.
Level of non audit fees
Ashbaugh et al “find no systematic evidence supporting Frankel et al’s claim that auditors violate 
their independence as a result of clients purchasing relatively more non audit services.”14 They 
contest results from Frankel et al’s findings which are evidential of the fact that “auditor 
independence is compromised when clients pay high non audit fees relative to total fees.”15
Ashbaugh et al also argue that the total fees generated by the audit firm (sum of audit and non 
audit fees) provides more accurate and complete explanation of how economically dependent the 
audit firm is on the client.16 This measure, in their opinion, is a preferred measure to the fee ratio 
(ratio of non audit fees to audit fees) even though they accept that the fee ratio still “captures the 
relative monetary value” of the audit v non audit services provided by the audit firm to a client.17
In my opinion, both ratios are equally important and particularly with regards to the perspective 
which is being considered – whether the ratios are based on fees derived from a particular client 
or the total fees obtained from all clients. The extent to which an audit firm is economically 
dependent on a particular client may not be highlighted where only the fee ratio is considered. By 
comparing the non audit fees generated from a client, not only with the audit fees from such a 
client but also with the total fees generated by the audit firm, the degree of reliance placed on 
such an audit firm (on its client) becomes more evident. Moreover, even though the non audit fee 
to audit fee ratio for a particular firm may be high – hence indicating that reliance is placed on 
non audit fees from a particular client, such a perception may also change where the non audit fee 
earned by the audit firm is negligible in comparison to the total fees earned by the audit firm 
(from other clients).
The level of fee/s quoted and the services to which these fees apply not only determine whether 
threats such as self review, advocacy and other forms of threats exist, but also the significance of 
such threats.18 According to section 290 (220),19 “where the total fees from an audit client 
represent a large proportion of the total fees of the firm expressing the audit opinion, the 
                                                
14 See H Ashbaugh, R LaFond and B Mayhew “Do Non Audit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? 
Further Evidence” (2003) The Accounting Review (78) No 3 611-639 and also R Frankel, M Johnson and K Nelson 
“The Relation Between Auditors’ Fees For Non Audit Services and Earnings Management” (2002) The Accounting 
Review (77) 71-105 
15 ibid
16 See ibid at page 614
17 ibid
18 See section 240.2 “Fees and Other Types of Remuneration” Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(Revised July 2009) at page 29 
http://www.ifac.org/Store/Details.tmpl?SID=1247239521617174&Cart=1247239712617245 (last visited 3 
December 2009)
19 ibid
dependence on that client and concern about losing the client creates a self interest or 
intimidation threat.” Such a threat is dependent on factors such as:20
- The operating structure of the firm
- Whether the firm is well established or new; and
- The significance of the client qualitatively and/or quantitatively to the firm
Neither Chapter 8.221 of the Commission Recommendation 2002/590/EC - Statutory Auditors' 
Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles nor section 290 of the July 2009 
Revised Code, stipulate an accepted ratio for non audit and audit services (under subsection 220) 
in respect of total fees generated by a firm. Both the 2002 Recommendation and the Revised 
Code supplement this apparent gap by providing a range of safeguards which should be followed 
by the auditor before providing non audit services to a client. They also appear to demonstrate 
their commitment towards facilitating a principles based approach to regulation – one which not 
only allows for greater flexibility than would be the case if a ratio were stipulated, but one which 
considers the auditor’s need to exercise professional judgement.
Some of the poorest audits which have been observed in practice, an example of which is 
provided by Mr Hayward of “Independent Audit”, have been undertaken by audit firms whose 
ability to deliver high level quality audits was impaired by their “considerable level of ignorance 
about the client’s activities” – “the price for having no non audit work.”22
On the other hand, it is rightly contended that even if greater knowledge could be acquired about 
a client – as a result of non audit services being performed for such a client, such “knowledge 
spill overs” would not necessarily be used in generating better quality audits- where insufficient 
safeguards operated to ensure that the auditor’s independence was not compromised.23
Where non audit services are performed and sufficient safeguards operate to ensure that the level 
of fees generated from such services do not impact the auditor’s ability to remain objective and 
independent, then such services do not pose a threat. 
                                                
20 ibid
21 “Relationship between Total Fees and Total Revenues”
22 See observation of Mr Hayward of „Independent Audit“ Treasury Ninth Report, May 2009 Banking Crisis: 
Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/519/51909.htm#a37>
23 Quick and Rasmussen assert that „based on the current situation in audit markets, where audit services have 
low margins, it could be assumed that knowledge spillovers from consulting services are not used to increase audit 
quality but to reduce audit costs” and that “even if knowledge spillovers increase auditor’s ability to discover a 
breach in the client’s accounting system, such an increase in effectiveness would be worthless if the auditor did not 
report the breach – owing to lack of independence.” See R Quick and B Warming Rasmussen, ‘ Auditor 
Independence and the Provision of Non Audit Services: Perceptions by German Investors (2009) International 
Journal of Auditing (13) at page 155
As stated by the Pensions Investment Research Company (PIRC),24 in relation to the majority of 
cases for UK listed banks, “ the considerable level of fees paid by such banks to their auditors for 
non audit work creates a situation which would not only facilitate a conflict of interest, but also 
affect the auditor’s independence and impair objectivity.”
Services identified by Quick and Rasmussen as having the potential to generate self review threat 
include internal control systems, book keeping, tax advisory, legal advisory, actuarial services, 
accounting information systems, internal audit, valuation, personnel lending, corporate 
management, risk management and financial services.25
2. Arguments in favour of market based regulation
Arguments which favour market self-regulation over government mandated legislation are 
justified on the basis that “markets excel in adapting to changing circumstances, while legislation 
and government regulation are notoriously rigid.”26 Further, O’Driscoll and Hoskins argue that “ 
self regulation does not refer to so-called self-regulating industry or professional bodies that 
frequently protect producers against consumers, but that rather, it refers to evolved orders, rules, 
and institutions by which the market regulates behaviour.”27 They justify the ability of markets to 
self-regulate on the premises that “reputation, or the fear of its loss, religious or ethical 
constraints not only restricts opportunistic behaviour”, but that actions involving theft, cheating, 
telling lies are limited because markets make such behaviours costly.28
Such argument however, does not take into consideration meta regulatory strategies and 
principles based regulation. Even though market based regulation obviously has its advantages, I 
would not advocate a purely oriented market based approach to regulation. Principles based 
regulation not only takes into account the legislator’s intent, but also considers the changes and 
developments which have taken or are taking place in the market. In other words, it still 
incorporates some element of market based regulation. Likewise, Basel II, which is an example 
of meta regulation, not only embraces vital elements of prudential supervision (capital adequacy 
requirements), but also the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3). 
As a result, a purely oriented market based approach to regulation, is not only lacking in several 
respects, but would not (on its own) offer the much required responses to changes and evolution 
within the financial and audit markets – from a regulatory perspective.
Whilst meta regulation, with its “collaborative approach to rule generation,”29 is considered to be 
the most evolved form of regulation, principles based regulation also allows some degree of 
flexibility which takes into consideration changes and evolvements in the market. Market based 
regulation does not facilitate the same degree of compliance and monitoring (which are essential 
                                                
24 See paragraph 234 of Treasury Ninth Report, May 2009 Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance 
and Pay in the City
25 „All non audit services investigated were considered to have the potential to create self review threats, 
familiarity threats and intimidation threats.
26 See GP O’Driscoll and L Hoskins, “The Case For Market Based Regulation” (2006) Volume 26 No 3 
Autumn 2006 at page 483
27 ibid at page 473
28 ibid at page 474
29 See F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) Volume 39 at page 3 
in regulation) as that conferred by meta regulatory based strategies. As stated previously, some 
element of control and accountability is still required in regulation – even though religious and 
moral ethics, costs attributed from loss of reputation, may still deter opportunistic behaviour. The 
recent enhancements to the Basel II framework illustrate how regulation can be harnessed to 
adapt to an evolving regulatory environment in which risks have assumed such prominence.
Meta regulation can be described as the regulation of self-regulation.30 Meta risk regulation 
concerns the management of internal risk and being able to use the firms' own internal risk 
management systems to achieve regulatory objectives.31 Another advantage of meta regulation is 
that it not only provides greater means of overcoming challenges associated with regulation, but 
also those problems of rigidity resulting from too many prescriptive rules.32
O’Driscoll and Hoskins refer to Kenneth Arrow’s observation of economics as being “the most 
important intellectual contribution to the notion that through the workings of an entire system, 
effects may be very different, and even opposed to intentions.”33 This, in their opinion, mirrors 
Adam Smith’s idea of the invisible hand. In a nutshell, they explain that institutions have evolved 
in such a way, that their current state was probably not what had been intended – hence 
illustrating the unpredictable outcomes of evolution. However, O’Driscoll and Hoskins add that 
“the evolutionary mode of reasoning has not been consistently extended to fundamental 
institutions such as law.”34
3. The changing approach to standard setting at EU level – principles based regulation
The growth of financial conglomerates and increased integration within the EU have impacted 
the financial markets – as evidenced by the approaches adopted in some member states in 
response to integrated financial services supervision and the ever growing realisation of the need 
for harmonisation amongst EU member states. Structures of conglomerates and cross sector 
services risks are factors which to a large extent, have posed immense challenges for supervisors.
The structure and system of financial regulation need to adapt to changes and evolutionary 
outcomes which have arisen within the financial markets in recent years. As illustrated by BCCI, 
“effective prudential supervision was impeded by lack of information, an opaque conglomerate 
                                                
30 The last but one chapter of Christine Parker’s book, The Open Corporation: Self Regulation and Corporate 
Citizenship, provides this title. The theme of meta regulation was developed by Peter Grabosky, where he refers to 
“meta-monitoring” as government monitoring of self-monitoring. See J Braithwaite, ‘Meta Risk Management and 
Responsive Governance’ Paper to Risk Regulation, Accountability and Development Conference, University of 
Manchester, 26-27 June 2003
31 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice  (2006) at page 37 “The 
Basel II Capital Accord provides an example of the operation of meta regulation in that bank capitalisation is not to 
be imposed externally by regulators but will be determined by a bank's own internal risk management models 
provided these models are considered by regulators to be adequate. One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is 
that it should enable the regulator exploit the expertise of the industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of 
modern risk calls into question the ability of financial regulators to stay one step ahead.”; ibid
32 F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) Vol 39 
33 GP O’Driscoll and L Hoskins, “The Case For Market Based Regulation” (2006) Volume 26 No 3 Autumn 
2006 at page 471
34 ibid; To corroborate this, they introduce Carl Manger’s statement on the scope of social science :”How can 
it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development, come into 
being without a common will directed towards establishing them?” 
structure, and the difficulty encountered by all the various regulatory and other financial bodies in 
exchanging information and cooperating satisfactorily when the group ran into difficulties.”35
The ensuing section attempts to evaluate not only the efforts attained by certain directives and 
legislation but also the progress which has been sustained over the years in relation to these 
legislation and also to financial developments which have taken place in the EU and around the 
globe.
The 2006 Statutory Audit Directive36 underlines the importance of harmonisation among EU 
member states if its objectives are to be realised. A principles based approach to regulation, 
which the 2002 Recommendation on Statutory Auditors37 strongly supports, would facilitate the 
process of harmonising different approaches adopted in different member states and with 
particular reference to different audit market environments which operate - since what may be 
beneficial for one member state may not benefit the other.
Whilst the introduction of audit liability caps would also generate certain benefits38, Bigus and 
Zimmerman argue that in introducing audit liability caps, consideration should be had towards 
the possibility that audit incentives may be impaired.39 As additional measures, actions aimed at 
the consolidation of competition, actions such as those which would make market entry much 
easier, have been proposed.40Such actions (apart from the introduction of low audit liability 
caps), include the enactment of less complex and less rigid regulations on accounting and 
auditing.41
i) A principles based approach to regulation would not only facilitate greater harmonisation of the 
different regulatory approaches adopted in different member states, but would also assist the 
auditor in performing many functions which require the exercise of professional judgement.42
The 2002 Recommendation of Statutory Auditor’s Independence in the EU acknowledges the 
benefits attributed to the principles based approach in “catering for the almost infinite variations 
in individual circumstances that arise in practice and in the different legal environments 
throughout the EU.”43
ii) A principles based approach not only facilitates the need to exercise professional judgements, 
but also a more “market friendly” environment. Further, the tendency by auditors to resort to 
defensive auditing (a practice whereby auditors use prescriptive rules to justify their actions) is 
                                                
35 See M Thorn, „The Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in the EU” North American 
Actuarial Journal Volume 4 No 3 page 128
36 See Paragraph 32 of the Preamble to the Directive
37 See particularly paragraph 11, COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 16 May 2002 Statutory Auditors' 
Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles’
38 The introduction of liability caps would not only reduce the likelihood of a large sized audit firm’s failure, 
but could also reduce market concentration in audit markets.
39 J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit 
Market: A Descriptive Analysis’ (2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 174
40 ibid at pages 174-175
41 ibid at 175
42 In relation to the need to exercise professional judgement, please see Chapter 2 of the Commission 
Recommendation 2002/590/EC - Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles
43 See paragraph 11 of the Preamble to COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 16 May 2002 Statutory 
Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles
reduced since principles based regulation encourages auditors to apply rules according to the 
spirit and intent of the legislator.
“Regulation should be market friendly, meaning that it should aim to facilitate market sanctions 
in the case of audit failure, instead of substituting such market sanctions with regulatory or 
judicial sanctions. Otherwise regulation risks inducing so-called “defensive auditing”, with 
auditors using only easily verifiable evidence to support their opinions, with the end result that 
audits become trivial.”44
The level of non audit services provided by the major accounting firms (the Big Four) needs to be 
curtailed. Regulation should be aimed at introducing standards and legislation which encourage 
mid tier firms in providing a greater level of non audit services than they currently provide. 
4) Proposals for a change in the current arrangements
Having regard to the types of available safeguards - namely prohibitions, restrictions, policies, 
procedures and disclosures, on which mechanism should the regulator place greater emphasis? In 
order to facilitate a more market friendly environment where greater disclosure would be 
enhanced and also to avoid a system of regulation which is based on the prescriptive application 
of overly detailed rules, it would appear that more emphasis should be devoted towards greater 
informational disclosure. The previous and ensuing sections justify such a conclusion. The 
previous section has highlighted why an outright prohibition of the provision of non audit 
services (by audit firms) is not a desirable option. The following section highlights the wide and 
seemingly immense range of available safeguards which exist to safeguard the auditor’s 
independence – which is evidential of the fact that sufficient rules already exist.
More extensive prohibitions on the provision of non audit services by major accounting firms to 
their audit clients 
A complete prohibition of the provision of non audit services is not proposed given the benefits 
which NAS are capable of generating (“knowledge spillovers” and “differential benefits from 
recurring non audit services”). However, mid tier firms should be encouraged to undertake a 
greater level of non audit services than is the case at the present – whilst limiting the level of non 
audit services provided by the Big Four. 
Safeguards which exist to mitigate or eliminate threats to an auditor’s independence
In applying such safeguards, the 2002 Recommendation on Statutory Auditors in the EU, 
highlights the fact that regard is to be had to cost- benefit considerations. Paragraph 12 to the 
Preamble identifies the costs associated with safeguarding the auditor’s independence as 
                                                
44 See B Arrunada, “The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non 
Audit Services 1999 at page 3 Kluwer Academic Publishers
including “costs that are related to developing, maintaining, and enforcing safeguards to 
independence.”
Safeguards which currently exist and which should be implemented (when necessary) as means 
of eliminating threats to the auditor’s independence or reducing such threats “to an acceptable 
level” include:
- Making the client aware of the terms of the engagement and, in particular, the basis on 
which fees are charged and which services are covered by the quoted fee45
- Assigning appropriate time and qualified staff to the task46
- Obtaining knowledge and understanding of the client, its owners, managers and those 
responsible for its governance and business activities47
- Acquiring an appropriate understanding of the nature of the client’s business, the 
complexity of its operations, the specific requirements of the audit engagement and the 
purpose, nature and scope of the work to be performed by the auditor48
In all of the above situations, the auditor is required to evaluate the significance of threats which 
could compromise his independence before determining whether or not the stated safeguards 
should be applied.
Other safeguards relate to particular “emergency situations” where “accounting and book keeping 
services which would otherwise not be permitted under section 290 of the Revised Code49 are 
allowed in emergency or other unusual situations when it is impractical for the audit client to 
make other arrangements.”50 In such emergency situations,51 the following pre requisites should 
be satisfied:
- Those who provide the services should not be members of the audit team
- The services should be provided for only a short period of time and should not be 
expected to recur; and
- The situation should be discussed with those assigned with governance responsibilities
Under Section 2, Chapter 8.152 of the 2002 Recommendation on Statutory Auditor’s 
Independence in the EU, safeguards (in the form of obligations) are imposed on the auditor to 
ensure that “fee arrangements for audit engagements in which the amount of the remuneration is 
contingent upon the results of the service provided” are not concluded without a prior assessment 
of the risks that could be generated for the auditor’s independence. Further, such arrangements 
                                                
45 See Section 240.2 “Fees and Other Types of Remuneration” Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(Revised July 2009) at page 29 
46 ibid
47 Section 210.3 “Professional Appointment” Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (Revised July 
2009) at page 23
48 Section 210.7 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (Revised July 2009) at page 23
49 ibid
50   Such situations embraces examples such as where i) Only the firm is equipped with the resources and 
necessary knowledge of the client’s systems and procedures to assist the client in the timely preparation of its 
accounting records and financial statements and ii) where a restriction on the firm’s  ability to provide the services 
would result in significant difficulties for the client
51 See  i) and ii) ibid
52 Which deals with contingent fees
should not be concluded also without ensuring that necessary exist to reduce such risks (to 
independence ) to “an acceptable level.”53
The 2002 Recommendation on Statutory Auditor’s Independence in the EU54 also stipulates 
safeguards which should exist in relation to non audit services - where  a statutory auditor, an 
audit firm or one of its network member firms provides services other than statutory audit work 
(non audit services) to an audit client. Under chapter seven, and 7.1 in particular, an obligation is 
imposed on the statutory auditor to ensure that:
- Individuals employed by either the audit firm or its network member firm neither take any 
decision nor take part in any decision making on behalf of the auditor or one of its 
affiliates, or its management while providing a non audit service and;
- Even when not involved in decision making, the statutory auditor is obliges to determine 
from a list of provided safeguards55, which of these could be best implemented in order to
mitigate any residual threats to independence.
Disclosure
According to the Basel Committee,56 “ as public disclosure increases certainty in the market, 
improves transparency, facilitates valuation, and strengthens market discipline, it is important 
that banks publicly disclose information on a regular basis that enables market participants to 
make informed decisions about the soundness of their liquidity risk management framework and 
liquidity position.” The involvement of market participants in the process whereby the 
Committee strives to facilitate market discipline through the development of “a set of disclosure 
requirements which will allow such market participants to assess key pieces of information on the 
scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence capital 
adequacy of an institution”57 constitutes a vital means whereby effective corporate governance 
could be facilitated.
Do sufficient disclosure requirements exist at EU level?
If compliance58 with rules could always be guaranteed, then market based regulation would 
probably be preferred to meta regulation or principles based regulation. In this respect, the 
                                                
53 Part (b) of Section 2, Chapter 8.1 states that “unless the Statutory Auditor is satisfied that there are 
appropriate safeguards in place to overcome the independence threats, either the non-audit engagement must be 
refused or the Statutory Auditor must resign from the Statutory Audit to allow the acceptance of the non audit work.”
54 Commission Recommendation 2002/590/EC - Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of 
Fundamental Principles
55 These safeguards include arrangements to reduce risks of self review, routine notification of any audit and 
non audit engagement to those in the audit firm or network who are responsible for safeguarding independence, 
secondary and external reviews.
56 See „Revisions to Pillar 3“ (Market Discipline) paragraph 73 at page 24
57 See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications 
July 2009 at page 29
58 See R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds), “Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance” and particularly section 8 
by C Parker, “Is there a Reliable Way to Evaluate Organisational Compliance Programs?” Canberra Australian 
Institute of Criminology 2004 Research and Public Policy Series No 57
importance of transparency and disclosure, which would be facilitated through good corporate 
governance and the role of the audit (in holding the management and directorship of a company 
accountable to its shareholders) is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this section aims to 
highlight legislative responses to developments which have taken place over recent years and to 
draw attention to the need for continued legislative amendments.
The Post BCCI Directive59 is considered to have “ considerably widened the scope of information 
exchange with other official bodies (within the EU) who are not responsible for prudential 
supervision.”60 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Directive draws attention to the principles of 
mutual recognition and home member state supervision which require “that member states’ 
competent authorities should not grant or should withdraw authorisation” where certain factors61
reveal that the legal system of one member state has been chosen for the purposes of evading 
more stringent standards which exist in a particular member state where the financial undertaking 
is presently62 undertaking a large part of its activities.
Such rules on authorisation are intended to facilitate disclosure and reporting requirements where 
information is required by “competent authorities” for purposes of facilitating their functions, 
which in turn contribute to consolidating stability within the financial system. Furthermore, the 
Directive makes reference to the reporting requirements of auditors63 and to the fact that such 
duties should cover all situations where the discoveries are made by an auditor during the course 
of performing tasks in an undertaking which has close links with a financial undertaking.64 The 
Directive qualifies such duties to report65 with the “good faith requirement”66 under Article 5 , 
paragraph 2.
The Need for Enhanced Disclosure Requirements
Having regards to Pillars 1 and 2 of Basel II, it can be observed that immense focus has already 
been dedicated to the role and responsibilities of banks (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review 
process (Pillar 2). In relation to Pillar 3, greater efforts are being undertaken to involve market 
participants by encouraging them to assess a bank’s risk profile. Even though it could be argued 
                                                
59 Directive 95/26/EC 
60 See M Thorn, “The Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in the EU” North American 
Actuarial Journal Volume 4 No 3 at page 129
61 Such as details contained within its programmes of operations and the geographical allocation of 
activities actually undertaken
62 Or intends to undertake a greater part of its activities
63 See paragraph 15 of the Preamble to the Directive which states that “ ….for the purposes of 
strengthening the prudential supervision of financial undertakings and protection of clients of financial undertakings 
and protection of clients of financial undertaking, it should be stipulated that an auditor must have a duty to report 
promptly to the competent authorities, wherever as provided for by the Directive, if he becomes aware, while 
carrying out his tasks, of certain facts which are likely have a serious impact on the financial situation of a financial 
undertaking.”
64 See paragraph 16;ibid. Furthermore paragraph 17 adds that such duties of auditors to communicate, 
wherever appropriate, does not in itself alter the nature of their tasks in such an undertaking nor the manner in which 
they must perform those tasks in that undertaking. 
65 As stated under Article 5 paragraph 1 of the Directive
66
It does so by highlighting the fact that such disclosures “shall not constitute a breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract of by any legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provision and shall not involve such persons in liability of any kind”
that the three pillars complement one another67 – hence the seemingly unnecessary need to 
consider whether efforts should evenly balanced between the three pillars, it becomes necessary 
to re evaluate efforts where a particular pillar appears to have been overwhelmingly ignored. 
Recent reports have revealed the lack of knowledge demonstrated by financial institutions in 
relation to risks involved when engaged with “businesses and structured credit products.”68 The 
fact that banks “did not adhere to the fundamental tenets of sound financial judgement and 
prudent risk management” was also highlighted.69
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, greater efforts have been undertaken to involve market 
participants by encouraging them to assess a bank’s risk profile. Such proactive efforts are more 
desirable than “allowing markets to evolve and decide.” As identified by the Basel Committee, 
“improvements in risk management must evolve to keep pace with rapid financial innovation.70
Furthermore, it states that “ this is particularly relevant for participants in evolving and rapidly 
growing businesses.71 Innovation has increased the complexity and potential illiquidity of 
structured credit products – which in turn, could make such products not only more difficult to 
value and hedge, but also lead to inadvertent increases in overall risk.”72 “Further, the increased 
growth of complex investor specific products may result in thin markets that are illiquid – which 
could expose a bank to large losses in times of stress, if the associated risks are not well 
understood and managed in a timely and effective manner. Stress tests have been identified as 
means whereby investors’ uncertainty about the quality of bank balance sheets, could be 
eliminated.73
As a result even though markets should be allowed to evolve, checks and controls should exist to 
ensure that such market activities are effectively managed and controlled. Management 
information systems (MIS) and banks’ credit risk models should be flexible (and not overly 
sensitive) in order to adapt to the evolving market whilst providing for some element of control. 
The Basel Committee furthermore, acknowledges the role assumed by management information 
systems and risk management processes in assisting the bank “to identify and aggregate similar 
risk exposures across the firm, including legal entities, and asset types (eg loans, derivatives and 
structured products).”74
                                                
67 As stated by the Basel Committee under paragraph 809 , “ The purpose of Pillar 3 is to complement 
the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). 
See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
publications July 2009 at page 29 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf?noframes=1> 
68 ibid at page 10
69 ibid 
70 ibid at page 12
71 ibid
72 ibid
73 See “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses” Section 3.2.1’ Crisis Resolution 
Policies: Stress Testing of Banks” http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/thematic_articles/article15893_en.htm It is 
also highlighted in the report that stress tests could serve as “decisive tools in accomplishing this task since they 
provide information about banks’ resilience and ability to absorb possible shocks.”
74 See ibid at paragragh 29, page 17. The Basel Committee  attributes the increased likelihood that different 
sectors of a bank are exposed to a common set of products, risk factors or counter parties, to the growth of market 
based intermediation.
Pillar 3 requirements are aimed at supplementing the other two pillars of the Basel II framework 
“ by allowing market participants to assess a bank’s capital adequacy through key pieces of 
information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposure and risk assessment process.”75
Even though it is acknowledged that these requirements:  a) facilitate a common disclosure 
framework which accordingly, ii) would not only promote comparability between banks but also 
allow a bank to interpret the specifics of each requirement, iii)increase flexibility for effective 
disclosures which reflect its risk profile to a greater extent, as well as facilitating greater 
consistency, the potential of such increased flexibility in impairing comparability between banks, 
is also highlighted.76
Chapter 5 of the 2002 Recommendation on Statutory Auditors77 not only sets out how total fee 
income, audit or non audit fees should be treated, but also stipulates situations whereby fees from 
an audit client for audit and non audit services provided during the client’s reporting period, are 
required to be “publicly and appropriately disclosed.”78
Pillar 3 revisions also include disclosure requirements that will assist market participants in 
acquiring greater understanding in relation to the risks profile of an institution.79 The Committee 
believes that such enhanced disclosure requirements will be instrumental in helping to avoid a 
situation where a “recurrence of market uncertainties about the strength of banks’ balance sheets” 
in relation to their securitisation activities, could occur.80
Disclosure requirements: Close links
A further measure which serves to enable banks and regulators identify risks, mitigate these risks, 
limit market activities which generate theses risks, is embodied in the Post BCCI Directive . 
Article 2 paragraph 2 not only states that “where close links exist between the financial 
undertaking and other natural or legal persons, the competent authorities shall grant authorization 
only if those links do not prevent the effective exercise of their supervisory functions”
But that
“the competent authorities shall require financial undertakings to provide them with the 
information they require to monitor compliance with the conditions referred to under paragraph 2 
on a continuous basis.”
In light of what has been discussed under this section, it will be concluded that even though 
efforts have been undertaken to address evolutionary outcomes within the market and changes in 
the global markets, such efforts would be fruitless in the absence of continual updates and 
changes to legislation – updates and changes which should respond to evolutionary outcomes 
within the market.
                                                
75 Ibid at page 29
76 ibid
77 Commission Recommendation 2002/590/EC - Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of 
Fundamental Principles, “Public Disclosure of Fees”
78 Also see “Disclosure of Fees” under section 4.1.2 of Annex at page 18 of 36 and section 5 “Public 
Disclosure of Fees” page 20 of 36.
79 See „Enhancements to the Basel II framework: Changes to the Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements“ at page 
29
80 ibid
Conclusion
Amongst other stated benefits, a principles based approach to regulation serves as a vital 
instrument in efforts aimed at facilitating competition and harmonisation. Disclosure 
requirements should not only aim to facilitate greater disclosure to the regulator and regulated 
institutions, but also strive towards engaging market participants in the disclosure process. 
Auditors and audits are important tools in corporate governance and the provision of non audit 
services could also enhance the quality of financial statements and financial information 
conveyed to investors where adequate safeguards exist to ensure that such auditor’s independence 
is not compromised whilst providing an opinion on the financial statements.
Perceived benefits arising from the provision of non audit services should be taken into 
consideration – hence the support for proposals which do not favour a complete prohibition of 
non audit services. By encouraging mid tier firms to undertake a higher level of non audit 
services, this would not only foster greater competition within the audit market, but should also
consequentially improve the quality of audits.81 Even though comparisons have been drawn 
between the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive and the 8th Council Directive, the scope of the 
requirements in the field of auditing have been expanded under the 2006 Statutory Audit 
Directive.82 The 2006 Statutory Audit Directive “ redefines ownership/control arrangements 
away from their jurisdiction-specific nature towards a more European approach although firms 
still have to register in the EU member states where they have audits.”83 Furthermore, in light of 
its strong support for a principles based approach to regulation, the 2006 Statutory Audit 
Directive cannot be considered to be a replica of the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX).
If compliance could be ensured, then there would be no need for monitoring and market based 
regulation would probably be the ultimate option. However, there will always be a need for 
constant monitoring and compliance – hence a meta regulatory based strategy such as that 
provided by Basel II which not only incorporates essential elements of prudential supervision, the 
supervisory review process, but also market discipline. Enhanced disclosures under Basel II 
(Pillar 3) and several other measures which include stress testing procedures have not only
contributed to enhanced disclosures but also more market friendly measures.
                                                
81 For more information on this, please see paper M Ojo on “Regulating the International Audit Market and 
the Removal of Barriers to Entry: The Provision of Non Audit Services by Audit Firms and the 2006 Statutory Audit 
Directive” http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18624/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1504703
82 See „Up-date on the EU Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC)” 
<http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm/route/147481/icaew_ga/Technical_Business_Topics/Topics/Audit_and_assurance
/Update_on_the_EU_Statutory_Audit_Directive_revised_8th_Company_Law_Audit_and_Assurance_ICAEW/pdf> 
(last visited 11 December 2009)
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